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1. Exposition 
The law is law and policy is policy. In realistic sense, what the law and 
the policy is almost changing day in day out. Nowadays, all over the world, a 
modern State is a political state. Public policies are prevailing decisions mostly 
of a state regarding those activities that societies will undertake, permit, or 
prohibit. These policies are characteristically made explicit in declarations, laws, 
regulations and judicial decisions: but they are also, and perhaps more 
significantly, implicit in what people do. The process through which the public 
activities of people are directed is public administration - which this becomes a 
realistic expression of public policy. This complex directing process of society 
not only includes the regulations of governments, but, in a functional sense, 
extends to the public-purpose activities of non-governmental organizations, 
often undertaken in association with government and sometimes in opposition 
to it. For any matter of social concern to become a focus for direction of public 
policy and polity, there must be some minimal level of social consensus, not 
only with respect to the problematic conditions, but also with respect to social 
goals. 
And, also in realistic sense, law is wbat officials do, or whatever is 
done officially. 1 This doing of something about disputes, this doing of it 
reasonably, is the business of the law "And the people who have the doing of it 
in charge, whether they be judges or sheriffs or clerks or jailers or lawyers, are 
officials of the law. Wbat these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the 
law itself."2 
For a large mass of lawyers a minimal level of social consensus 
concerning law and public administration is the rule of law, the true law, the 
legality. For instance, the report of the International Commission of Jurists 
(New Delhi, 1959) emphasised a positive aspect of the rule of law by arguing 
that is depends not only on the provision of adequate safeguards against abuse 
1R. Pound-. Fifty Years of Jurisprudence. 51. Harvard Law Review, 74 (1938) p. 800. 
2 K. Lewellyn: The Bramble Bush. (1930), p. 3. 
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of power but also on the existence of effective government capable of 
maintaining law and order and of achieving such social and economic 
conditions as will ensure a reasonable standard of economic security, social 
welfare and education for the mass of the people. The report claims in this 
connection, that the legislature has a positive role, that delegated legislation may 
be found to be necessary, but also that it is essential that there should be certain 
limitations on the legislative power, that the acts of the executive which directly 
and injuriously affect the person or property or rights of the individual should 
be subject to review either by a specialised system of administrative courts or by 
the ordinary courts, that citizens who suffer injury through an illegal act of the 
executive should have an adequate remedy against the state, that decisions of 
tribunals should be subject to review by the courts, and that the executive 
should give reasons for its decisions.3 
What is the existent form of the above-mentiones "adequate remedy"? 
Wade says, everyone knows that the British Constitution is founded on the rule 
of law, but the more closely we inspect this sacred conception the more elusive 
we find it. Its simplest meaning is that everything must be done according to 
law, but in that sense it gives little comfort unless it also means that the law must 
not give the government too much power.4 Government under the rule of law 
demands proper legal limits on the exercise of power. This does not mean 
merely that acts of authority must be justified by law, for if the law is wide 
enough it can justify a dictatorship based on the tyrannical but perfectly legal 
principle quod principi placuit legis babet vigorem. The rule of law requires 
something further. Powers must first be approved by Parliament, and must then 
be granted by Parliament within definable limits.5 
Legislative power belongs to the Parliament (or to the Congress in USA), 
and to the Parliament (or Congress) alone. And, of course, legislative power 
encompasses all law-making. It is well established (perhaps) that as a matter of 
constitutional principle the ligislative power cannot be delegated.6 But a 
government usually, makes different legal norms. In a rather large number the 
actions of a government are law-making actions. And, in a sociological sense, 
factually the courts also make rules for legal practice. And, in the practice, the all 
3 The Rule of Law in a Free Society, published by the Commission, and see N.S. Marsb: 
The Rule of Law as a Supra-National Concept. In: Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, ed. by 
A.G.Guest., Oxford Univ.Press, (1961) 
4 H.W.RWade: Administrative Law. Oxford, Clarendon Law Series, (1961), p. 6. 
5 H.W.R. Wade-, ibid. p. 37. 
6 See, for instance,/. Dickinson-. Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the 
United States. Nesw York, (1959), chapter IV., R. Pound: The Spirit of the Common Law. (1921)., 
W.I. Jennings: The Law and the Constitution, 5th ed., (1959)-, E.B. Prettyman: Trial by Agency. The 
Virginia Law Review Association, (1959)-> M. Dimock: Law and Dynamic Administration. New York, 
(1980)., D.H. Rosembloom - J.D. Carroll: Toward Constitutional Competence: A Casebook for 
Public Administrators. Englewood Cliff. NJ., (1990), chapter I. 
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kind of regulations are valid.7 The law requires a hearing in an adjudication. It 
requires a real hearing of both side of an iusse, not a meaningless formalism. 
The law does not sanction the combination of the roles of prosecutor and judge 
in one person. There is also the problem created by the formulation of policies 
beyond, or even contrary to, statutes. There is the major problem concerning 
findings of facts and conclusions of law. The law requires that findings of facts 
be upon evidence, and that conclusions of law be upon these findings. It does 
not countenance preconception or unsupported assumptions as substitutes for 
hard facts spread upon the record. It forbids findings fitted to a predetermined 
results or to a cause.8 Institutionally, the increase in executive power has 
manifested itself in the growth of administrative authorities, in the rise of the 
administrative process. Legally, the result has been the development of public 
administration law. And in this development is an other chapter of the 
development of judge made law. 
The theoretical answer comes from the idea of Rule of Law. But the 
rules of the Rule of Law we cannot find in the text of a constitution, an Act, or 
other formal source of law. Thus, first of all, it is a doctrine of jurisprudence or 
a specific thesis of legal argumentation. It is a real doctrine in that case when it 
is applied by practice. Without practical application the rules of the Rule of Law 
are theoretical tenets. In this way, the problem of the Rule of Law may be a 
practical and theoretical question. 
2. Rule of Law 
The range of interpretation of the principle Rule of Law is the 
functioning of the modern political state. In the modern political state the 
powers are separated, i.e. there is a legislative, an executive, and a judicial 
power. 
C. Montesquieu defines the doctrine of the separation of powers as a 
condition of liberty. The legislative power, i.e. the Parliament has the right to 
legislate. The judicial power is not legislative. The executive power is neither 
legislative nor judicial, but the executor of the public resolutions. There would 
be an end of everything, were the same man or body, whether of the nobles or 
of the people to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of 
executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.9 
In this triangle supremacy rests with the legislation. Rousseau's idea 
was the infallibility of the législateur of the volonté générale. Montesquieu's 
tenet was the rationality of the state. The highest rule for political conduct is not 
regulated by a moral standard but solely by raison d'état. Montesquieu's 
7 Compare, Kovács István-. A törvény és törvényerejű rendelet problematikájához (I. 
Kovács Sur la problématique de la loi et du décret-loi), Állam- és Jogtudomány, Vol. XVI. N.3. (1973) 
8 See Judge Prettyman, ibid, p. 7. 
9 See CMontesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws. Hafner's edition, p. 152. 
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doctrine of the separation of powers included also a comprehension of the 
significance of economic equality. According to him, economic eguality is a 
condition of human freedom. Only in a relatively equal society will the 
separation of power be able to function as a guarantee for human freedom and 
security. 1 0  
At the beginning of the modern political state was another typical 
doctrine laissez fairs, an argumentation of industrialists against landowners, 
which defined laissez faire as a condition of liberty. But in this sense the 
government is a necessary evil, and law is an infraction of liberty.11 Laissez faire 
policy, of course, was liberty of contract and freedom for employers bent on 
maximising profits in the early industrial age. 
The first classic of the Rule of Law was Albert Venn Dicey. I think that in 
1885, when Dicey published his famous "The Law of the Constitution", a large 
number of lawyers had a private opinion about Montesquieu's tenet on the 
separation of powers. The American Constitution utilized this distribution, but 
contained a lot of other principles. 
The American Constitution was rather similar to the English one.12 Both 
contained supports from natural law. The constitutional interpretation 
accepted the importance of natural, codified and common law, i.e. the higher 
law background of constitutional law was supposed to be in conformity with 
natural and common law. Actually the codified law created by legislative power 
was only a small part of American and English law. 
The American or English judge, as is well-know, was not a simple law-
applier. In these countries, however, to modify constitution was difficult and 
infrequent In the US the Supreme Court did interpret the Constitution in 
accordance with policy,13 i.e. judicial reason was (and is) subordinated to 
1 0 LD. Eriksson-. Repudiating Montesquieu! Helsinki, (1990) p. 2. 
1 1/ Stone: Human Law and Human Justice. Stanford University Press, (1965). p. 120. 
1 2 This is an interesting illustration of the point which Prof. Wade make: "It is always 
hard to know which note one should strike louder, should we stress how similar we are, or how 
different we are? At the outset one feels most tempted to stress differences: our English doctrines 
of parliamentary sovereignty and ministerial responsibility, which profoundly affect our 
administrative law, are quite strange to American minds. You have a written constitution containing 
express guarantees of civil rights, and a legislature which cannot tamper with these guaratees 
except under special safeguards. We have an omnipotent Parliament which, if it liked, could repeal 
Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights and the Habeas Corpus Acts tomorrow • and by simple 
majorities. Not only do we have no entrenched rights but it seems that we cannot get them even if 
we want them. For nothing can prevent any statute of any description being repealed by this 
unbridled power which Parliament has. Then there is ministerial responsibility t6 Parliament. Again 
and again discussion of our divergencies comes back to this doctrine, which greatly affects the 
whole atmosphere in which administration is conducted." H.WJL Wade-. Towards Administrative 
Justice. The University of Michigan Press (1963). p. 3. 
1 3 Compare M. Spabr. When the Supreme Court Subordinates Judicial Reason to 
Legislation. In: Rational Decision, Nomos VII. New York, (1964), p. 162. 
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governmental-political considerations, and from another point of view, making 
judicial legislation. And, last but not least, the executive power made also legal 
rules, for solving public goals. At the end of the 19th century the separation of 
powers was not a realistic fact but only a theoretical tenet. As far as laissez 
faire is concerned, it was under a cloud. 
A V. Dicey defines the Rule of Law as procedural regularity of equal 
liberty under law. The Ride of Law or supremacy of law comes from the English 
constitution. "That 'rule of law* then, which forms a fundamental priciple of the 
constitution, has three meanings, or may be regarded from three different points 
of view. 
It means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy or predominance of 
regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the 
existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority 
on the part of the government. Englishmen are ruled by the law, and by the law 
alone; a man may .with us be punished for a breach of law, but he can be 
punished for nothing else."14 
Another meaning of the rule of law, says Dicey, is that "when we speak 
of the 'rule of law1 as a characteristic of our country, not only that with us no 
man is above the law, but (what is a different thing) that here every man, 
whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm 
and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals."15 Every man is 
subject to ordinary law administered by ordinary tribunals. 
The third meaning of the rule of law, according to Dicey, is that whereas 
in many countries private rights such as freedom from arrest are sought to be 
guarateed by a statement in a written constitution of the general principles 
relating thereto, with us these rights are the result of court decision in particular 
cases which have actually arisen.16 "The 'rule of lav/ lastly, may be used as a 
formula for expressing the fact that with us the law of the constitution, the rules 
which .in foreign countries naturally form part of a constitutional code, are not 
the source but the consequence of the rights of individuals, as defined and 
enforced by the courts; that, in short the principles of private law have with us 
been by the action of the counts and Parliament so extended as to determine the 
position of the Crown and of its servants; this the constitution is the result of the 
ordinary law of the land."17. 
The equality or equal liberty before the law can be given definite as in. 
the procedural guarantees of Magna Carta, and the original sense of "dike 
process of law". 
The Rule of law as an individualistic conception of liberty is 
characteristic in the theory of Prof. FA. Hayek. The real function of law must be 
the true type of law. "Nothing distinguishes more clearly conditions in a free 
1 4 A V. Dicey: The Law of the Constitution. 10th ed., London, (I960), p. 202. 
1 5 A.V. Dicey: ibid, p. 193-
1 6 A V. Dicey: ibid, p. 195. 
1 7 A V. Dicey: ibid, p. 203. 
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country from those in a country under arbitrary government than the 
observance in the former of the great principles known as the rule of law. 
Stripped of all technicalities this means that government in all its actions is 
bound by rules fixes and announced beforehand - rules which make it possible 
to foresee with fair certainly how the authority will use its coercive powers in 
given circumstances, and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this 
knowledge."18 
For Hayek, law contained two types of norms, i.e. rules of just conduct, 
like private law and criminal law, and rules of organisations. The real territory 
of the rule of law is rules of just conduct. The legislative organs have authority 
to amend existing judgedeclared rules where, owing to a change of economic 
background, they no longer reflect community standards of corrective and 
distributive justice. But they have no authority to make selective redistributions 
of resources in the interests of particular groups. A governmental legislation for 
private sphere, private law, violates the rule of law. The true law grows and is 
not made. 
In Lon L. Fuller's view the existence of a relatively stable reciprocity of 
expectations between lawgiver and subject is part of the very idea of a 
functioning legal order. "Though the principles of legality are in large measure 
interdependent, in distinguishing law from managerial direction the key 
principle is that I have described as 'congruence between official action and 
declared rule'. Surely the very essence of the Rule of Law is that in acting upon 
the citizen. A government will faithfully apply rules previously declared as those 
to be followed by the citizen and as being determinative of his rights and duties. 
If the Rule of Law does not mean this, it means nothing. Applying rules faithfully 
implies, in turn, that rules will take the form of general declarations, ...law 
furnishes a base line for self-directed action, not a detailed set of instructions for 
accomplishing specific objects. 
The twin principles of generality and of faithful adherence by 
government to its own declared rules cannot be viewed as offering mere 
counsels of expediency."19 
Fuller's interpretation of the Rule of Law is connected with his 
conception about morality of law. The criteria of the morality of law, or the 
principles of legality are as follows: the requirements of generality, 
promulgation, non-retroactivity of laws, clarity, non-contradictions in the law, 
the possibilities of compliance, the constancy through time, and the congruance 
between official action and declared rule. And, the internal morality of law is not 
and cannot be a morality appropriate for every kind of governmental action. The 
procedure normally involves a series of accomodations and compromises among 
those to be affected by the final decision. 
1 8 FA. Hayek: The Road to Serfdom. (1946), p. 54. 
1 9 LL Fuller. The Morality of Law. (1969), p- 209-210. 
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The above very short survey of the Rule of Law touched only one side of 
the problem. On the idea of the Rule of Law different authors, in rather large 
numbers, polemize with one another. 
The other side of the problem is the applied rule of law doctrine. Of 
course, this is also changing.20 
Rule of Law, as an idea and as a practical doctrine is characteristic only 
in the world of English and American law. I think that the Rule of Law first of all 
is a specific, both ideological and practical tenet of English and American 
jurisprudence. As Marsh says: it is not more than a summary of the main 
principles of English constitutional law.21 It is not a general theory of law, but a 
presentation or interpretation of a specific legal order, i.e. of the Anglo-
American legal order. From a comparison of all phenomena which go under the 
name of English and American law, it seeks to discover the nature of law itself, 
to determine its structure and its typical forms, but is independent of the 
changing content which it exhibits at different times and among different 
peoples. In this manner the rule of law derives the general principles by means 
of which enacted law, adjudicative law, law made by contracts, and customary 
law can be interpreted and comprehended. 
The idea of the Rule of Law is one way of attacking legal positivism. 
Legal positivism is undoubtedly one kind of general theory of law. If somebody 
critized one sort of general theory of law, well, in that case it is not quite sure 
that he is also creator or another kind of general theory of law. That is, attacking 
positivism does not give any scientific rank for the Rule of Law, but it does not 
damage its theoretical positions either. Rule of Law is a thesis of jurisprudence 
or legal sciences and a doctrine of law in the English and American legal 
practice and political debate. 
3. Technical Theory of Jurisprudence 
Law can be interpreted in terms of what people think is a legal rule and 
order, then in terms of what is the meaning of a lawfully created legal norm, 
then with what content of meaning the judicial and other official organs apply 
the rules as well as from different other professional aspects. The result - if we 
wish to define the law - depends on in what kind of range of interpretation we 
tried to define the law. 
For us, the point of departure is the realm ofpositive law. A legal norm 
or rule is positive in that case when rule is applied in practice or may be 
applied in practice. Norm is positive because it is effectually valid by the 
practice. Positivity of a norm is a question of fact. That which is applied in 
practice, that is the positive law. 
2 0 See, for instance, RC.S. Wade-. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution. In: AV. Dicey-. The Law of the Constitution. (I960), p. cxiii - cxxxv. 
2 1 N.S. Marsh: ibid, p. 223-
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In the modern political state the legislation is a political operation. The 
legislative organs are political organs. The Parliament, the Congress, the 
government are political organs. But the government is a law-maker and law 
applying organ. In the modern political state the legislation is a specific 
technique of politics. 
Application of a rule is always a technical operation. Without some 
operations we cannot apply the rules. In the world of law, the operations are 
factually characteristic. Creating and applying the law, and human behavior 
with legal relavance, have specific operations, specific technique. The technique 
of the legislative, judicial and other law applying organs is their procedure. The 
citizens'conduct as a technique is not a procedure but simply a technique. The 
functioning of law is the functioning of a specific technique. 
The Technical Theory of Jurisprudence establishes those general 
principles by means of which the functioning of any legal order can be 
comprehended. It anwsers the question of what the actually functioning law 
is, not what it ought to be. The latter question is one of politics or ideologists, 
while the technical theory of law is a legal science. 
The regularity of the practical funkctioning of law is a normal technique, 
an applied realistic solution. To ascertain and generalize the regularities of this 
technique constitutes the technical theory of jurisprudence. 
Some general methodological rules that can be related to the legal 
order as rule-standards are as follows: 
a) The positive law can be constructed as a specific social technique. In 
this respect the paramount theoretical interpretability of law is that it is a 
functioning social system of rule-standards. Any tenet of a legal character which 
fails to function in reality can only be interpreted as a lawrelated principle, or 
legal ideology. 
b) The social bases of the functioning of law is the credibility of its 
hypotheses, in a given case independently of the tightness, truefulness, justness, 
untruefulness, etc. that may be associated with it, which are and will remain 
areas of political, .moralistic, economic, religious and other interpretation. 
c) The legal system or law as a system of norins is an induced form. In 
this sense as a basis of normativity, it is perforce a hypothesis. This shows itself 
best in legislation as an operation of the technology process. During the 
creation of a legal norm, the validity, the usefulness and effectuality of norm is 
pure assumption. 
d) The actual functioning of law may be factually interpreted, 
irrespective of the fact that only data on legal conflict-situations are at our 
disposal. The law as fact: this is legal practice. This law can be interpreted in 
time and space. The practice can be appropriately typified by the legislation and 
the law case. A principal technological feature of the legal norm is that it can be 
multiplied to various kinds of law-suits. To distinguish between "general", 
"typical", "specific" and "individual" cases, that is only a joke with philosophical 
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categories. A construction of a legal norm may be "general" and "special", 
"typical" and "individual", perhaps. A principal feature of the law cases is that 
they are unique and irreversible. 
e) The law as a norm - it is necessarily a defined norm. It is indifferent 
from this aspect that it is codified law or judiciary law. From a technical point of 
view, here the main question is only whether we have a valid legal rule for 
practice or not. The legal practice positivâtes the rules, both codified and non-
codified ones. 
f) Modern law - or the law functioning in the modern political state - is 
defined first and foremost by the state, by the legislative power, which 
constitutes one system, i.e. the system of legislation. Law in the modern state 
constitutes only one paradigm-system, which is the valid law. 
g) Modem law - as a system of rule-standards primarily defined by 
legislation is based on one axiom-system only, which legal practice is used. In 
the world of modem law we cannot find a classical form of customary law. The 
judge-declared law is virtually a continuation of the sporadicism and 
individualism of medieval law traditions. Actually, in the countries of judge-
declared law, the jurisdiction is guided by legal norms of legislation and 
decisions of higher law-courts. In such a way the centraliyation is effectively 
unified. From a technical point of view it is not a main question that from which 
sources of positive law this unity of the axiom-system of law has arisen. 
h) In the definition of the generally known and unknown parameters of 
law as well as in the choice of legal-paradigms, the governmental bodies play a 
dominant role. It is in the manner of form and not that of content that the law 
delimits government of a state. For the governmental legislative power can alter 
the content of legal rules at any time and, hence, the change of laws is 
connected with the change of government in modern political states. This, 
however, involves that in the modern political state the legislature and executive 
tend to come very close to each other. 
i) Positive law - as an actually functioning system of rules - does not 
originate exclusively from a central etatistic idea, but it is much rather a self-
generating phenomenon. It generates from itself as a fact. This fact is the law-
creating act- and the law suit as an act. The effect or "imprint" of a temporally 
earlier act of legislative and executive will ever be left upon government and 
legal order, and will, among others, delimit one of the finalities of the actions of 
government. This is a certain continuity in time and space, but it is not sure that 
it is a continuous rationality. And this applies also, to some degree, to earlier law 
cases and jurisdictions. As opposed to this, the interpretation of modern law 
tends to argue with "rationalities". On closer inspection the majority of these 
appears as evidence or feeds on axiom-like bases. 
j) The rules of positive law are reproducible and multiplible. The time 
and space dimension of a legal norm is artifically constructed, such as legal force 
in-time and territory, i.e. it is a prescription of norm. Realistically a legal norm is 
non-defined in space and time: that is law in force. The world of law consists of 
facts, rules and interpretations. Law-suit as a situation can be defined as mass of 
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facts. The situation is unique and irreproducible. Only similar situations can 
arise, and not identical ones. 
Interpretation of law can be defined as a specific technical operation 
with facts, rules and principles. Functioning of law is by interpretation. This is 
evident because the situation and norm are different in space and time. The 
interpretation of determinate character is mostly worked out in the professional 
lawyer's sphere as the interpretation by legislation and by jurisdiction and by 
other application of law. 
In terms of operations, the lawyer does not interpret directly principles 
of norms, but expounds rather situations of decision and judgments or ruling, 
that is "rationalizes" by means of norms and principles. By means of such 
principles like "tightness", "justfulness", "freedom", "legality", "truthfulness", 
"democratism", "equality before the law", "fairness", "rule of law" etc. as to the 
creation of legal norms - and by means of norms - in cases of jurisdiction and 
other law-application - which people presuppose to be right and just, which 
warrant equality before the law, justful, freedom, legal, which are fair and are 
equal to other similar principles, that is, they are equal to other similar 
principles, that is, they are lawful. Significantly, these concepts, principles and 
rules not only hypothesize and symbolize reality in some manner, but the 
technical operations and/or manipulations with them somehow generate it as 
well. Or do not, we may add. 
What can guarantee the functioning of the governmental legislation and 
judge-declared rules if at the passing of decision neither legislation nor 
jurisdiction has at its disposal an exact way of evidence? Or put it differently, 
what is the permissible margin of error in these situations? 
A realistic answer may be that it is society' recipiency at a given or 
concrete situation determined in timespace dimensions, that is the credibility by 
society of the legislator's and the law-applier's act. Social credibility usually 
comes about not through the persuasive force of sem kind of absolute and 
logically sound deduction. A legal decision may meet a general social acceptance 
even on purely emotional grounds. The bases of social credibility may be varied, 
and may change in a variety of ways. This may be rationality, a correspondence 
with different principles and ideas, the manner of decision-making, confidence 
in the correctness or necessity of the procedure, belief, respect of authority, 
expectation in future, feeling of intimidation, defencelessness, coercion, terror 
and so on. Credibility cannot be traced back always to the same cause, or the 
same type of group of causes. 
In other words: the functioning capacity of the legal norms relies upon 
its social credibility as a legal norm. Essentially, this is on the one hand the 
assumption that legal norm contains a satisfactory, acceptable rule, and on the 
other hand that in case of a violation of the rule the law-courts and other law-
applying organs will indeed take measures against anyone who foils to observe 
the norm. The functioning capacity of legal norm, therefore, lies in its usability 
as a motivational social technique and the coercive power of the official 
jurisdiction. The legal technique of functioning is thus a unity of persuation and 
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coercion, i,e. the combination of two kinds of technique. This unity is not a 
theoretical question, but in full measure a pragmatic one, which can be solved 
only in a concrete situation. In the modem political state the motivation and the 
coercion are basic practical questions of legislation and all techniques of law in 
function. 
4. On some limits of legislation 
•There appear to be three major areas of interest in legislation today. 
First, there is the question of how the major governmental structures - state, 
local, governmental and non-governmental - should be legislative authorities. 
Second, there is a renewed interest in reexamining the traditional theory of the 
relationship between politics and legislation, and reevaluating the role of the 
legislator in the formation of policy. Third, there is a growing awareness that 
there is a "human aspect" to legislation, that legislation is concerned with the 
behaviors of human beings. 
Legislation is the normal activity of a legislator. Legislative bodies are 
generally the governmental bodies, i.e. the Parliament, the government, and the. 
local bodies. In the modem state, under the doctrine of separation of powers, 
administrative agencies must not be permitted to exercies legislative functions. 
The communist theory of law does not accept separation of powers, 
and in the communist dictatorships the legislative and executive powers are 
fused. The doctrine that the legislative power, being a delegated power, cannot 
be re-delegated is closely allied with the doctrine of separation of powers. But at 
present, in all kinds of modem states including of course communist 
dictatorships, the executive power actually esercise law-making, as delegated 
legislation.' 
All legislative organs have . some ultimate legal bases in the 
; constitution. Legislative bodies form written or codified law. In J. Bentbam's 
opinion, only written law deserves being called law. because it alone possesses 
a certain manifest foundation and certainty. But .in the theory of Rule of Law we 
can find another thesis by A V. Dicey, namely, that the constitution is not the 
source but the consequence of the rigbt of individuals. According to this, the 
rights of individuals' exist, and a higher legislative power - the parliament - only 
explain that, in a right form. 
What is the role of parliament in this context, and what is the reason of 
sovereignty? "Which is stronger: the legislator's law, or the doctrine of rule of 
law? Or, is the sovereignty of a parliament compatible with the rule of law? The 
answer may be the equality supposed, i.e., mdividuum and parliament are 
under the same conditions, moreover, they are "equal". I am afraid that at the 
present time, this is an absurdity both theoretically and effectively. Parliament 
has a legal supremacy of the law, while the individual has not. Parliament has a 
right to legislate, the individual has not. 
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There is another aspect of the question in Hayek's thesis: the true law 
grows and is not made, rules of just conduct are not really a territory of the 
legislator's law. It appears on the basis of fact that the division of norms into 
"law proper" and "law of organization" is a nice theoretical aspect. But at present 
to separate them in practice is rather difficult In a certain sense, here lies the 
question of what law is. 
Law as a norm is rule, a model of human behaviour, primarily for the 
subjects of law, and a measure for conduct, primarily for the law applying 
organs, and it means both for the legislators and thus, it is obligatory. 
The law, for instance, in the last century nn England, America and 
Hungary, was neither codified law, the legislator's law, nor any other positive 
law; for this could not test its own validity. It protects the natural right of life, 
liberty and property: written laws are usually tuned to local customs and 
institutions. In that law. certainly, the morality, the practical rationality, the 
customs and traditions could play an essential role. Then, the norms, the 
principles and legal doctrines were possible as equivalents to each other. In that 
situation, the doctrine of rule of law could be used easily in practice: it may be a 
model or guide for the legislator, and a measure of law for judicial review. 
Nowadays the codified law is typical in Hungary, and legislator's law is 
rather characteristic, for instance, of England and US, especially in public 
administration. The last sixty years have seen a growth of public affairs and 
expansion of public administration. Many regulations deal with matters such as 
the safety in factories, environmental protection, energy-supply, safety off 
consumer goods, regulation of building, of road traffic and many similar matters. 
These matters are regulated by Acts, orders, statutory instruments, public bills 
which become law, bye-laws, etc. In administrative law sometimes it is 
exceedingly difficult to distinguish the "rules of just conduct" from "law off 
organization", as suggested by Prof. Hayek. Therefore Ms conception of Rule off 
Law is suspicious, i.e., its validity in administrative law and public administration 
is dubious. And if we add that administrative law makes up the substantial pant 
of the law, well then, the position of the conception does not fare any better. 
A counter-argument is given by Prof. Dicey (The Law of the 
Constitution, Appendix 2), as he writes that (the French), administrative law is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the Rule of law. 
Jurisdiction may be an other aspect of interpretation of the rule of law. 
Jurisdiction is the normal activity of an independent court Equality before the 
law can be given as a procedural guarantee, and the original sense of "the rules 
of natural justice" in England, and what in US is called "the due process of law". 
Prof. Fuller claims that where courts are applied as a means of enforcing 
congruence between official action and declared rule, due process of law is a 
useful instrument 
But opinions do differ. In US. for example, the legislative bodies have 
the right to determine the structure of new administrative organizations. But in 
framing the basic legislation the organizators must attempt to predict what the 
courts will do when they review the activities of the new organization. That is to 
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way, as a program may be illegal in any form, it is considered by the courts lest 
private individuals should not be deprived of their life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law. Others might claim that till the end of 1930's the US 
Supreme Court was generally dominated by a majority of justices to whom "due 
process of law" meant something akin to laissez faire. 
Jurisdiction is neither legislation not public administration. But, under 
the Rule of law, judicial legislation has completed, corrected, modified legal 
norms enacted by legislative organs, and, first of all private law. As public law is 
concerned, it is a massive fact of English and American law that officials are 
liable before the ordinary courts, and that judicial review of administrative 
action is undertaken by the ordinary courts applying ordinary remedies. 
And now, let's come back to Fuller-, "the very essence of the rule of 
law... a government will faithfully apply rules previously declared as those to be 
followed by the citiyen and as being determinative of his rights and duties. "Well, 
when the court modifies common-law. rules, it does not apply faithfully the rules 
previously declared as those to be followed by the citizen. And what is more, the 
citizen will learn his rights and duties from the judicial decision. That is to way, 
judicial legislation is typically retroactive. It does not matter, it is not opposite to 
the Rule of Law. The Constitution of US forbids to pass ex post facto law. But a 
judicial decision cannot be regarded as ex post facto law, because the ratio 
decidendi in the future will be determinative. (!) 
The Rule of law-ideal constitutes some limits for legislation. Legality, 
moral qualities, freedom, equality as equal liberty before the law, equal 
application of law. truthful law, fairness, regularity, i.e. categories with which 
Rule of law operates, are well-know as components of other legal conceptions.. 
Rule of law as a principle or theory for legislation is-too general, like some kind 
off an outline. Some arguments of Rule of Law one can find for instance at 
Aristotele, in the Roman law, or an the old Hungarian law. So the juristic essence 
off the rule of law is known to lawyers all over the world. Butt the Rule of Law as 
a doctrine is valid, at the very most, in the countries of common law (i.e. in 
these countries that-is a real legal technique). 
The Rule of law has certainly a small or second-hand importance as 
legal theory of legislation. Its theses are plausible, its methodology is uncertain, 
eclectical. The rule of law as a legal technique is effective and - as a technique -
is very important, of course, first of all in the common law countries. In this 
'sense the rule of law is a measure or means of legal policy. Rule of law is,, 
certainly, a selective view of society, law politics, • morality, ' legislation, 
jurisdiction, etc. for this reason it may be a successful piece of English-American 
legal-political praxis. Rule off Law ns excellent food for a member of parliament 
in opposition, for advocates and legal advisors, judges and for clever scholars. 
From the aspect off the Technical Theory of Jurisprudence the Rule of 
law as a legal technique is ami excellent but old-fashioned technique. • Since, 
from tthe seventeenth century on, authoritarian governments have existed next 
to democratic ones, and ~ since in the twentieth century totcdUarian 
governments have existed next to non-SoMlitarian ones, the claim of all these 
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systems to legality and rationality must be disputable. The diversity of 
democratic rationalization is also evident in the question of legislation, law and 
justification. Its internal and external conditions hardly correspond to the Rule 
of Law ideal. Legality or rule of law is connected with international relations. 
It is also connected with human aspect. This does not imply at present 
time, what is good or truthful for the people, but what is accepted or what may 
be accepted by the people. In view of the technical theory of jurisprudence, the 
main limitation for legislation is credibility. Credibility is a fact and is not a 
theoretical supposition. Positive law as a generally accepted law is not adequate 
with the law-making decisions of legislature and the law is not in any case what 
the judge decides. 
In its theoretical foundations the Rule of Law is perhaps natural law, 
but directly it is constitutionality, what proceeds from the Constitution. But it is 
not enough to say that citizens are ruled by the law, and by the law alone, which 
CQmes from the constitution: for that is true even of the most Power State. The 
constitutions now in force, however, are political ones. The constitution can 
scarcely be considered as a "universal logos". Nor can it be stated that the 
Constitution is identical with the axiom-system of the positive law or law in 
force. 
The conception of the Constitution as an absolute is absurd of legal 
myth. Nor can be derived from the Constitution some rule of law as a universal 
logos. It should be kept in mind that all norms are equally binding: the 
Constitution is no more binding than the act, and the act is no more binding 
than the bye-laws. 
The human aspect of law is its credibility. Law is a kind of rule which 
the people are willing to accept as a legal norm. The best technique of the 
preparation and creation of law is when the legislator and the law-applying 
organs, through their decisions, succeed in reaching a consensus or respect of 
the people or the nation involved, i.e. in earning the nation's trust. And this is 
by no means simple. 
It is a central aim in all forms of democracy, and a fancied one in 
dictatorships. Democracies and dictatorships, both weak and strong, do crop up 
time and again. Yet it should not be forgotten that people are prone to clap now 
for a democracy, now for a dictator, at least temporarily. And in either case it is 
what people accept as law will eventually prevail and function. For there is no 
"general will" in the creation of law, still there really is something akin to it in its 
acceptance. The Greek philosopher, Protagora, stated that "man is the measure 
of all things". A norm that becomes positive law is usually the one that is 
universally credible as a legal rule to the subjects. The law is law. 
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